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In the Supreme Court
of th·e Stat.e of Utah
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF MAUDE K. BARLOW, ALSO
KNOWN AS MAUDE KARREN
RICHARDS, AND MAUDE l(.
RICHARDS, DECEASED

Case No.

8682

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ~ Case No.
OF ~1AUDE KARREN RICHARDS,
8683
DECEASED.
SHELDON R. BREWSTER, AUDREY
B. BELL, HOYT W. BREWSTER,
KYLE H. BREWSTER, AND LAEI_j
B. GEE,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
-

vs.-

Case No.
8825

\"VILijiAl\1 BARLOW, ET AL.,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF WILLIAM BARLO·W
RESPONDENT IN CASE NO. 8682 AND CASE
NO. 8683 AND DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT IN CASE NO. 8825
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Substantial agreement with the Statement of Facts
contained in the Brief of Hoyt W. Brewster is expressed
wjth the exreptions anrl addition~ hereinafter noted.
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The Trial Court in Case N·o. 8825 by its Judgment,
(8825 R. 89) found and adjudged that a marriage of
Maude l{arren Richards and Ben S. Brewster subsequent to the date of the execution of their agreement
and reciprocal wills would not revoke either of their
reciprocal wills. This belies the staten1ent of Brewster
that there was uncertainty of such marriage. Such marriage was not doubted before.
Doubt is noted as to statement that by making on
September 20, 1952 another Will after her marriage to
\\Tilliam Barlow, the Decedent named violated her agreement with B·en S. Brewster. Same is a point of law
to be determined by this Court. Admission is made
that Decedent did execute such ''Till.
In Case No. 8825, Appellant made no concession
that under the facts of this particular case the agreement between the parties ·Should be enforced. In Argument in Case No. 8683 to the Trial Court same as a
principle of la\Y had to be conceded and such reason
therefor \Yill become clear hereafter. In Case N·o. 8825,
at the Pre-Trial thereof, (8825 R. 62) issue of la\v \Vas
whether Respondents were entitled to specific performance of the contract and \Yills. \\~ e believe that this was
therefore an issue at the Pre-Trial and cannot agree
with counsel for Bre\vster that it "-as not such issue.

By its Judgment in Case No. SS25 the Court spe·cifi~ally

ordered Appellant to deliver to Respondents
all proceeds he 1nny have recei 'Ted fro1n certain insuraneP policies ( 8~:2[l 1~. 89) and to al~o deliYer to Respondcnt·s a.ll moneys in joint bank accounts "Tith hitnself and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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said decedent. (8825 R. 90) However, after Motion ~-,·or
r~ evv Trial in said case was argued by Appellant (8825
R. 91), the Trial Court inserted in said Judgment, ''except as to any money contributed by William Barlow''.
(8825 R. 90) No e.vidence was taken by the Court before entering such J udgn1ent as to the present existence
of the property vvhich the Trial Court awarded to Respondents.
lJpon application of Respondents in Case No. 8825,
Appellant was by Order of the Trial Court (8825 R. 14
and 15) directed not to move forward to collect and
receive any proceeds of any insurance policies of decedent and in effect Appellant was directed to let every
asset remain in status quo. Later, by its Judgment
(8825 R. 89 and 90), A.ppellant was directed to deliver
to Respondents that which he was heretofore restrained
from obtaining. Undoubtedly, proceeds of certain insurance policies of decedent have been lost by reason
of Appellant being restrained from collecting same and
cannot be delivered to the Respondents. H,owever, the
Trial Court by its Judgment was not concerned vvith
the fact that the property existed. No Findings were
made by the Court and no evidence considered on
·whether or not the property \vas available.
Hoyt W. Brewster filed for Probate of V\t..,.ill of decedent in Case No. 8683. Practically simultaneously he
filed the action, Case No. 8825, for specific performance
of the \Jlill as a contract. While his Appeals of Cases
Nos. 8GR2 and 8683 were pending in this Court, he fjled
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N otiee of Readiness for Trial in No. 8825. (8825 R. 56)
Appellant filed Objections thereto (8825 R. 57 and 58)
pointing out that No. 8825 was not at issue until it was
determined by this Court \\Thich vVill of decedent was
to be upheld. If "\Vill propounded by Brewster was upheld by this Court then there ",.as no necessity for proceeding with his action of Case No. 8825. The vVill of
decedent w·ould have been acted upon as such Will and
not as a Contract. However, Hoyt W. Brewster, insisted
upon such hearing and determination of No. 8825 and
the net result of the rulings are of his own making and
inconsistency.
Reservation is herewith made to state further pertinent facts hereinafter should need for same become
apparent.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE OLO·GRAPHIC 'VILL OF DECEDENT, MAUDE
K. BARLOW, DATED SEPTEMBER 20, 1952, SHOULD
HAVE BEEN AND WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED TO
PROBATE AS THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
DECEDENT AND WILL OF DECEDENT, DATED FEBRUARY 7,1939, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED
TO PROBATE AS THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF DECEDENT.
POINT II.
THE C01JRT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT,
DATED DECEMBER 10, 1957. DECREEING THAT SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE OF DECEDENT AND BEN S.
BREWSTER DID NOT RE\rOJ{E THEIR AGREEMENT
AND RECIPROCAL WILLS.
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POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN SAID JUDGMENT BY DECREEING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF RECIPROCAL
WILL OF DECEDENT, MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS,
AND AGREEMENT OF SAID DECEDENT AND BEN S.
BREWSTER.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN SAID JUDGMENT BY DECREEING THAT ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF DECEDENT AT TIME OF HER DEATH BE
AWARDED TO RESPONDENTS.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Before proceeding with Argument on the Points
enumerated, Counsel for Appellant state that for clarity
they deem it wise to firstly dispose ·of which of the Wills
should have been admitted to probate before proceeding with the problem of ·enforcement of one of the Wills
as a contract. Also, in the discussion of said Points
answer will be made to the P·oints stated in Brief of
Hoyt vV. Bre"\vster, et al., in ·so far as same require such
answer.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE OLOGRAPHIC WILL OF DECEDENT, MAUDE
K. BARLOW, DATED SEPTEMBER 20, 1952, SHOULD
HAVE BEEN AND WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED TO
PROBATE AS THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
DECEDENT AND WILL OF DECEDENT, DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1939, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED
TO PROBATE AS THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF DECEDENT.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Case No. 8683, \Vill of decedent, dated F·ebruary

7, 1939, was offered for probate. In Case No. 8682, Will
of decedent, dated September 20, 19'52, and Olographic
in form was offere<d f.or probate. Upon issues being
joined the problem in both cases to the Trial Court was
which Will should be admitted to probate as the Last
Will and Testament of the decedent who despite names
of Richards and Barlow was one and the same person.
The Trial Court in No. 8683 entered Judgment (8683 R.
46) that Will of decendent, dated F·ebruary 7, 1939 was
expressly revoked by her Will of September 20, 1952
and denied admission to probate of the Will of February
7, 1939 and adn1itted to probate the Will of decedent
dated September 20, 1952 as the Last V\Till and Testan1ent of decedent. The Trial Court in No. 8682 entered
Judgment (8682 R. 30 and 31) adjudging substantially
the same.
This Court in the case of In Re Howard's Estate,
2 Utah 2d. 112, 269 P. 2d. 1049, has stated that the ultimate issue in a will contest is not to "'hom decedent's
property should be distributed but is whether the instrument in question is the decedent's last will and testament. The Trial Court correctly follo,ved this basic
doctrine announced by this Court.
In the case of In Re llazce's Estate, 119 Misc. Re..
ports, 259, 196 N ...Y. S. ~35, at Page 255 the Court states:
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"It is now the settled law of this state that
the prior mutual will cannot be admitted to probate ;since it is not the last will of the decedent
and that a subsequent will may be admitted ·subject
to the rights of the parties to compel a distribution of the estate under the terms of the contract
made by the testator.''
Page 256: "The authorities hold that the
determination of the question of whether the
mutual wills were executed and c-onstituted a contract for the distribution of the property must be
determined in an action in equity."
In the case of In Re Burke's Estate, Oregon, 134 P.
11, at Page 13, the Court states:
"It is no objection to the probate of a will
that it violates such an agreement, or revokes a
former will made in pursuance of it. While such
former will is revoked as a will, it still stands as
evidence of the Contract. In fact it has been held
in some instances that the revoking will must
fir·st be probated before a suit to enforce specific performanee of an agTeement under mutual
,,. ills ean be enforced.''
Appellant cites further authorities. In 69 Corpus
J~tris, Section 2720, Page 1300, it is stated:
''A mutual wi1l like any other will is revoked by the execution of a subsequent will inconsistent therewith. So vvhere a party to a
contract or agreement for mutual wills makes a
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later will, even without notice to, or the knowledge of the other party, or after the latter's
death, the mutual will cannot be admitted to
probate, since it is not the testator's will, and the
later will may be admitted without regard to the
fact that it does not comply with the agreement,
hut it is subject to the rights of interested persons
to co1npel a distribution of the estate under the
contract on which the mutual 'vill was founded,
their remedy being, howe.ver, in equity, and not
in the probate court, which has no choice but to
distribute the estate under the last will.''
In 69 Corpus Juris, Section 2719, Page 1299, it is
also stated:
"Joint and reciprocal "rills, not founded on
or ·e·mhodying any contract, may like ordinary
wills, be revoked at pleasure; and so, even after
the death of one of the makers, and after the
acceptance of the benefits under his 'vill, the
survivor may revoke his 'vill or the joint will so
far as it pertains to his property, but not, of
course, so far as it pertains to, ·and affects the
property of the decedent. ~Ioreover, "\\ hile it is
said that a will executed in pursuance of an
agreement f.or mutual wills is irrevocable, especially after the death of one of the parties to the
agree1nent the true rule is that a mutual " . ill,
like every other \Yill, is, as a testan1entary instrument, in its essence and by its .Yery· nature ambulator~:r and re,Tocable throug·h out the lifetime of
the testator, and that it cannot be 1nade irrevoeable even by the most express covenant or
tPrn1s, nlthongh ns a compact it InaY be irre7
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vocable, or enforceable notwithstanding its revocation as a will. So, no estate vests under the
will of the surviving party to an agre·ement for
·mutual wills, on the ground of its irrevocability
after the death of the first maker, all that vests,
if anything on the death of the first of the
testators is a right of action to enforce the contract against the survivor".
In 57 American Jurisprudence, Section 690, Pages
465 and 466, the following is stated:
''According to sound theory, one of two
testators who have made wills which are reciprocal in the circumstances that each will makes
provision for the testator of the other will may
revoke his will e.ven after the death of the .other
testator notwithstanding the wills were drawn
and executed pursuant to a contract. This does
not mean that the obligation of the contract is
escaped by revoking the will. =K• * * Therefore
a later will which revokes a prior \viii which was
jointly executed, or one of two separate wills
containing reciprocal bequests, is admissible to
probate, though the testator violated his contraet
by ex·ecuting it; and a jointly executed will or
one ·of two separate wills which are reciprocal
in their provisions is not admissible to probate
as the will of one of the testators who revoked
it, notwithstanding the revocation was a breach
of contract. Concisely stated, it is the contract
and not the joint will \Vhirh is irrevocable after
the death of a party''.
Further, in 57 American ,J?J.risprudence, Section 716,
Pa.gr 485, it is Rtated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''A probate court whose jurisdiction is limited
to the determination of the issue whether the instrument propounded is the last will of the decedent lacks power to enforce an agreement between tw·o testators to make wills which are
mutual and reciprocal. The establishment of a
trust for the purpose of enforcing a contract to
make wills containing re·ciprocal provisions is
not ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the probate or surrogate -court. Generally speaking, the
remedy of a p.erson injured by the violation of a
contract for the execution of wills containing
reciprocal bequests and bequests to third persons
effective upon the death of the surviving testator is not to be had in the contest of the probate
-of the will which constitutes the violation of
which ·complaint is made, ·Since, in the absen0e of
a statute, the only issue on a contested probate
is whether the paper prop.ounded is 'the last will
of the decedent'. Similarly, a contract jointly
to execute a single 'vill 'Yhirh is reciprocal in the
bequests made cannot be asserted as a ground
for contesting the probate of a later revoking
will''.

In Fuller vs. Nelle, 12 Cal. App.

~d.

576, 55 P. 2d.

1248, at Page 1250, the Court holds:

'' Follo,ying the doctrine of that case, In Re
Estntr of ('1arpenter, 104 Cal. _.\pp. 33, at page 34,
286 P. 348, this Court said: 'This court's action
\Vas c-orrret. 1\ "~in, though it may be irrevocable
as a contract, is none the less reYorable as a
""ill, and in ra~P ~ncb \\"ill is revokPd, th0 injured
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party cannot contest the later will in the probate
court on that ground or insist on the pro hate of
the earlier will but is remitted to an independent
action at law or in equity to enforce whatever
rights he may have''.
Lastly, our Sister State of Idaho in the case of IJf atter of Estate of Isaccson, 285 P. 2d. 1061, at Page 1063
holds:
"Although a joint vvill and acceptance of
benefits thereunder by the survivor ·may, under
some circumstances, constitute an irrevocable
contract, such facts do not make the joint will the
irre.vocable will of the survivor; and his j·oint
will may be revoked by a later will. Furthermore,
the question of whether an irrevocable eontract
exists is not an issue when the later vvill is
tendered for .probate. * * * The issues ·of whether
such an irrevocable contract exists and the enforcen1ent thereof are matters to be tried out in
court of equity, and are beyond the equitable
powers ·of the probate court in probate matters.
Dewey v. Schrieber lmplem.ent Co. 12 Idaho 280,
85 P. 9·21; Wilson v. Fackrell, 54 Idaho 515, 34 P.
2d. 409; Ashbarth v. Davis, 71 Idaho 150, 227 P.
2d. 954, 32 A. L. R. 2d. 361' '.
Will of decedent, same being Olographic and dated
September 20, 1952, was by the Trial Court, under the
authorities and cases cited, properly admitted to probate
as her I.Jast ''TiB and Testament. Her prior Will of
February 7, 1939 was properly dPnied probate hy the
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Trial C·ourt. In filing Case No. 8825, counsel for Brewster
was fully aware that the v-Vill of decedent he propounded
to the Court for admission could not be admitted as decedent'~s Last Will and Testament.
Under the authorities cited, I-Ioyt W. Brewster, had
no cause of action for specific performance of the \Vill
until the Probate Court had denied its admission to
probate. If the Will propounded by him had been admitted to probate, then necessity for specific performance w·ould have been alleviated.
It was a ca.se of first things first and even in la\Y
logical events follow one after another. B-eing unable to
take under the \~Vill, I-Ioyt \'\~'. Brewster then "'"as relegated to his remedy in equity for specific performance.
Under Points \:'I. and VII. in his Brief, Said Brewster, cites the minority eases of In Re Doerfer 's Estate,
Colorado, 67 P. 2d. 492 and In Re ~\_elkin's Estate, Kansas,
167 P. 2d. 618, but they are not reconcilable w·ith the
~\uthorities Appellant has heretofore quoted. Counsel
for Brewster admit this. Also, p·oint is n1ade that Brewster was denied his Executor's Fees. Truly, this is not
of import. Also, Sectio-n 15-1-6, U. C..A.. 1953 is cited
and quoted for the proposition that a Probate Court ran
proceed in probate rases to try and detern1ine questions
of frand ro1n1nitted hy a testator and \vhich 'vas the
point as to \Yhether or not thi~ Decedent committed
fraud upon t.hr Respondents by 1naking the later \Yill.
Thi~ Court hn~ frorn t.in1e \vny back held, and this
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Court is aware of such holdings, that a Probate Court
cannot try title to property and such questions as were
raised by Case No. 8825. It would certainly be an enlargement of the Statute, supra, if ~such jurisdiction
were now bestowed on Probate Courts.
The Trial Court sitting as a Pr·o bate Court properly refused to consolidate for trial and hearing Case
N 0. 8825 with c:ases NOS. 8682 and 8683. The Court
properly heard as a Probate Court said Cases Nos. 8682
and 8683. Case No. 882:5 f.ollowed thereafter. There is
no justification for ·clothing the Probate Court with such
jurisdiction as suggested by counsel for Brewster.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT,
DATED DECEMBER 10, 1957, DECREEING THAT SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE OF DECEDENT AND BEN S.
BREWSTER DID NOT REVOKE THEIR AGREEMENT
P_._ND RECIPROCAL WILLS.
The parties to such Agreement are long past this
jurisdiction s-o benefit of theil' testimony was beyond
the realm of production. I-Io\vever, Respondents never
once denied that after Ben S. Brewster and ~faude
I{arren Richards ·entered in to ·such Agreement and made
such Reciprocal Wills they were ~married to each other.
ltt this late date such denial or even question of such
marriage is not permissible. The Trial Court by its
.Judgment (8825 R. 89) found that such marriage existed.
The problem is now whether or not the vVill of said
dercdent, dated February 7, 1939, haYing been properly
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refused admission to probate ·should be considered as a
binding contract on the decedent. The issue is further
complicated by reason of the facts that said parties to
the agreement ~married each other after they made such
agreement and such Reciprocal \\'ills including said Will
of decedent of 1Tebruary 7, 1939. \Vill of Ben S. Brewster, (8825 Ex. 1, R. 60) gave said decedent ·one-third
of his property and did not mention her as his wife.
Thereafter, he married her and until date of his death
he made no other Will and did not make any written
settlement as required by Section 74-1-25, U. C. A. 1953.
Section 74-1-25. U. C. A. 1953, provides as follows:
"Effect of marriage, if wife survives. If
after making a "\Yill the testa tor marries and the
wife survives him, the "\\ill is conclusively presumed to be revoked, wnless provision has been
made for her either by 1narriage contract, or by
some written settlen~ent shou._:ing on its face the
testator's intention to substituie such contract or
settlement for a provisic·n in her .fapor in his -u·ill,
or unless she is provided for in the ttcill or in
such w·ay as to show an intention not to rnake
such provision; a·nd no· ecidence of other .facts
to rebut the presun1.ption of revocation can be
recei1)ed". (Italics ours)
The "rording of said lTtah Statute is clear and quite emphatic. Ben S. Bre'\\Tster did not eon1ply " . ith it after
marrying this decerlf'nt. Reason for showing such facts
are thnt R·rsponde11ts in Onse ~ o. 8825 in th~ir Amended
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Complaint (8825 R. 39) charge decedent with attempting
to commit a fraud upon them. If Ben S. Brewster did not
see fit to comply with the law after he married this decedent, ,surely this decedent had a right to make a later
Will.
In Brief of Hoyt v\T. Brewster, under Point I., cases
cited to the Trial Court by this Appellant in Memorandum submitted to said Court are cited and reviewed.
Reference is made to Brief of this Appellant so submitted. (8825 R. 63 to 71) Under said Point I, counsel
for Hoyt W. Brewster, urge that the Washington rule
be followed and that the minority opinion of the California Court in the case of In Re Poisl's Estate, 280 P.
2d. 789 be adopted. The c·alifornia Statute similar to
74-1-25, U. C. A. 1953. supra, is as follows:
''If a pers-on marries after making a will,
and the spouse survives the maker, the will is
revoked as to the spouse, unless provision has
been made for the spouse by marriage contract,
or unless the spouse is provided f.or in the will,
or in such way mentioned therein as to show an
intention not to make such provision, and no
other evidence to rebut the presumption of rev-ocation ran be received".

Crrli.fornia Probate Code, Section 70.
In all probability the Utah Statute, supra, was and is
based upon the California Statute just quoted. In the
rase of In Rc Poisl's

Estat~,

280 P. 2d. 789. Poisl on
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De·cernher 10, 1950 made a Will leaving personal property to Ern·ma Blackburn and referring to her by such
name. He died on June 16, 1952. Emma Blackburn Poisl
filed Petition to revoke probate claiming she was the
wife ·of Poisl and that they were married on July 18,
1951. The lower court held that provision was made
for her under the will by reason of the legacy to her by
name and that the will was not revoked under Section
70 of the Probate Code. The Appellate Court reversed
the lower Court and held that the mere naming of a
woman or giving of legacy to her by name in the will,
without indicating that she was the testator's prospective wife, was insufficient to prevent the revocation of
the '\\:rill as to her by her marriage to the testator after
the execution of the "rill. The Court stated that the indication that a '\\:roman given a legacy by name in the
'vill is testator's prospective wife must appear on the
face of the will to prevent revocation thereof as to her
by their n1arriage after the execution of the will and
extrinsic evidence is inadnuss-ible to sho\v the testator's
intention, at least unless there is so1ne ambiguity~ which
is not created by legacy to named "~o1nan alone, though
she is later married to the testator. The Court further
held that a 'vill must sho"r the testator's contemplation
of his future 1narriage to eon1ply '-rith the fundamental
purpose of the statute proYiding that a person's marriage after making a will to one ~urYiYing the n1aker revokes the w·ill as to such spouse unless she is provided
for in the \vil1. The object of the statutory provision

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
that a person ',s marriage after making a will to one
surviving the maker revokes the will as to such spouse,
unless she is provided for in the vvill or so mentioned
therein a~s to show the testator's intention not to n1ake
such pro.vision i~s to s-ecure specific moral influence on
the testamentary act of having in mind a contingent
event so momentuous as marriage.
Thusly, there is no doubt that the Brewster VVill
was revoked since it did not comply with the Statute.
Irrespective of the views of ·counsel for H·oyt W. Brewster, the ruling of In Re Po~sl's Estate is controlling
in Case No. 8825 and by reason of the similarity of the
Utah and California Statutes there is no justification
for wandering to Washington.
In the case of In Re Scolpino's Will, 248 N. Y. S.
634, the New York Court held that the testator's marriage after making a will effected a revocation not'vithstanding the giving of a legacy therein to a person
who afterward became the wife of the testator unless
the manner of reference to such woman fairly warranted
the view that the bequest to her iR in her prospective
status as his wife.
In the ca~se of In Re Anderson's Estate, Arizona
131 P. 975, the Court held that under the Civil Code
providing that, if after making a will the testator marries and the wife survives, the will shall be revoked, a
will is revoked by the marriage of the testator after
executing the will where his wife survives him and no
provision is made for her in a marriage contract or in
the wilL
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In 97 C. J. S. Section 1366 (d), Page 299, it 1s
stated:
''According to .some authorities, a statute
providing that a will shall be deemed to be revoked by the ·subsequent marriage of the testator is applicable to mutual wills and the same
holding has 'been made without reference to
statute; and on the marriage ·of one of the parties
to an agreement for mutual wills, revoking his
will, the will of the other party is like"rise revoked, although he has already died''.
1
•

In 69 C J. Sec. 2721, Page 1300, the same statement ap.pears substantially.
Invitation is made for entire reading of the case
of In Re Poisl's Estate, supra. It is conclusiYe of the
point herein. It is controlling.
In 95 C. J. 8. Sec. 291 (2), Page 76, it is stated:
"Under a statute declaring that if, after
making a \Yill, the testator marries and the wife
survi Yes, the \vill shall be reYoked unless she is
proyided for ·or 1nentioned in the n1anner indicated by the statute1 in the absence of such proYision coupled \vi th a failure to mention her as
indicated, the subsequent n1arriag-e operates as
a revocation of the testator's \Yill, and in the
a hsPlH'e of n n~,. proYision in the statute indicating
that tile \rill of the testator is reYoked pro tanto,
rP\·oeation hy reason of the subsequent 1narriage
of the tt'sta tor is absolute and \Yhere the statute
cl('rlnrP~ t.h:1t no ot.h0r PYidence than that specified
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in the statute, shall be received to rebut the presumption -of revocation, except as to such evidence the presumption of revocation is conclusive''.
Therefore the conclusion must be reached that the
\"Viii of Ben S. Brewster 'vas revoked and the ruling of
the Trial Court that it was not was erroneous.
Under Points III, IV, and V, in his Brief, Hoyt W.
Bre,vster, asserts that this Appellant is barred from
questioning the validity of the Brewster vVill and the
probate thereof; or from contesting the said Will and
that Appellant is estopped from denying the validity of
such \Viii. However, this Appellant is not doing so. It
1nust he noted that this decedent was charged with
breach of agreement and more or less fraud in Case No.
8825. If Brewster'.s Will was revoked as a matter of
law, then that factor must be kept in mind in the determination of whether or not this decedent breached the
agreement.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN SAID JUDGMENT BY DECREEING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF RECIPROCAL
WILL OF DECEDENT, MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS,
AND AGREEMENT OF SAID DECEDENT AND BEN S.
BREvVSTER.

Hoyt W. Brewster acted as Executor of the Will of
Ben S. Brewster along with the decedent, Maude Karren Richards. (8825 R. 60) He, with knowledge of the
marriage, propounded to the Probate Court the \Vill of
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Ben· S. Brewster which he should have known was revoked. Surely, H·oyt W. Brewster, does not approach
the Courts with clean hands but he de1nands that he
receive equity. Maude Karren Richards received and
obtained from the estate of Brewster ONE THJRD
thereof and no more. (8825 R. 60) Respondents now demand the whole and every \Yordly possession of this
decedent.
The Reciprocal Will of February 7, 1939 is no favorite child of the law. In 69 Corp~~rs Juris, Section 2718,
Page 1299, it is stated:
"It has been observed, however, that joint,
mutual, reciprocal, or double wills, while receiving judicial sanction, are nevertheless 'no favorite children of the la\v' ".
This Court speaking in the ease of TT"" ard rs. Tr· ard,
96 Utah 263, 85 P. 2d. 635, at Page 273, makes the follo\Ying statement:
''Under some circun1stances a will 1nay constitute a contract that 1nay be irrevocable; under
other circumstances it 1nay constitute a contract
onl~T' and a breach thereof might be measured
in dan1ages; or in other cases the ,~rill is revocable,
ambulatory and 1nay be a1uended or chang-ed to
1neet the n1ind of thP 1nakcr at any time. \\~h_en
1-l1P \Vill 1s sought to be 1nainb1ined also as a rontr:let, tla"}re 1nnst be sufficient to satisfy the statn1 (' of frn nfls if the \Yill dor~s not rlo son.
At Pn.f?.'(\ :274,

thi~ c~onrt

further

sav~:
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is generally held that such contracts will be closely scrutinized and strictly construed''.
Respondents are not in the position to demand that they
be, without question, given specific performance of the
'Vill and Agreement. They have no absolute right thereto. Courts are not too anxious to uphold such contracts.
In the case of Florey vs. Meeker, Oregon, 240 P. 2d. 1177,
in interpreting a joint \Vill the Court held that the will
did not preclude the surviving testator from substituting
his second wife as lega tee after the death of his first
wife. The Court refused to enforce the Contract in
favor of the legatees.
The Trial Court overlooked the foregoing law and
failed to examine this will and Agreement with "\vatchful eye. Examination of said Agreement (8825, Ex. 1,
R. 60) reveals that Ben S. Brewster and Maude Karren
Richards did not contract thereby NOT TO REVOI{E
THEIR "\\TILLS. There was no such provision inserted
in said Agreement. This decedent did not agree in writing NOT to rev·oke the will required of her under said
agreement. This Court in the case of Ward 'VS. Ward,
supra, has laid down the proposition that such instruments as we are no\v confronted \Vi th must satisfy the
Statute of Frauds of this State and must fulfill the requirements of Section 25-5-1, et seq., U. C. A. 1953. This
Court has not directly ruled on the proposition that such
Agreement should have, to he enforceable, contained a
provision not to revoke the ·will. HowPvPr, other Courts
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when met with such point have ruled that an agreement
not to revoke a will must be in writing and is within
the Statute of Frauds. In the case of Carzaurang vs.
Carrey, California, 4 P. 2d. 259, the Court at Page 261
says:
''An agreement not to revoke a will already
n1ade is just as much an agreement to make
a provision for another by will as an agreement
to make a will devising or bequeathing property
to the pro-misee, and in our opinion the former
is just as much within the Statute as the latter''.
In the case of Rubin vs. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288,
the Court in discussing Subdivision 7 of Section 31 of
Personal Property La"r of New York which is similar
to our Statute states at Page 297 thereof:
''For the purpose of that statute there can
be no difference between a -contract 'to bequeath
property or to 1nake a testamentary provision'
and a contract to refrain from altering an existing \vill, for "\Yills are ineffectiYe until the death
of the testator. (See l\Iatter of LeYin, 302 ~. Y.
5350.) ''
In the case of .Jlattcr of Lrrin, 302 K. Y. 535, the Court
at Page 541 says:
''Upon fan1iliar practice a n1en1o of a contrn(lt required by statute to be in 'Yriting n1ust
he by and of itself a con1plete expression of the
intention of thP pn rties "\Yithout reference to parol
PYidenee (~..'Jtulsaft 1'. ill errer Tube & lllfg. Co. 2SS
N.

v·.

2flrl) ".
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In c·ase No. 8825, Appellant by his Answer to amended
C·omplaint of Respondents (8825 R. 44) stated in his
First Defense that the a·ction of Respondents was barred
by the Statute of Frauds. The Decedent not having
agreed in writing to revoke her Will made pursuant to
said Agreen1ent had a right to do so and by making the
I_jater vVill she did not breach the Agreement.
Having married Ben S. Brewster after the execution ·of said Reciprocal ,~Vilis and Agreement, Respondent upon his death received upon the probate of his
Will One-Third of his estate ( 8825, R. 60). w·hether
same was received as his widow or under the Will of
Ben S. Bre\vster, this Decedent received only what she
\Vas lawfully entitled to. This Decedent may have, being
fully mindful of her n1arriage to Brewster, chosen to
taken under the \Vill instead of under Section 74-4-4,
U. C. A. 1953. In either event she would receive only
one-third of his estate and that is what she obtained.
lJnder Point I, IIoyt ,V. Brewster, in his Brief recognizes the right of this decedent to take under Section
74-4-4, U. C. A. 195.3. This decedent obtained as the
wife of Ben S. Brewster only what she would have received as his wife on his intestacy.
Respondents' cause of action in Case No. 8825 is
founded on the breach of agreement by this decedent
and upon her commission of fraud upon them. The facts
and the law show that Respondents have no cause of
action upon such grounds.
Under Point II, in his Brief, IIoyt ,V. Brewster,
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contends that the Contract was not revoked but since
the C·ontract contained no provision that D.ecedent would
not revoke the Will such Contract is not enforceable. .
The Respondents must have known of the marriage
of this Decedent to their Father, Ben S. Brewster. They
were parties to the Probate of his \V.ill and they did
not grant to this Decedent nothing more than the law,
itself, "\vould have granted to her. They have suffered no
loss by the action of this Decedent which they now complain of.
There is a problem of consideration existing for the
enforcement of this \~Vill of decedent of February 7, 1939
and the Agreement. Let same be explored further. Both
instrun1ents should be integrated and interpreted jointly.
Courts of Equity scrutinize such instruments Yery carefully and are not quick to enforce the same. In the case
of J(lussman vs. lVessli·ng, 238 Ill. 568, 87 N. E. 544, the
Court at Page 546 states:
''Courts of equity look with jealousy upon
the evidence offered in support of such a contract, and will 'Yeigh such eYidence in the most
scrupulous manner. * * * Equity "~in not grant
specific performance of such a contract if it is
unconscionable, inequitable, or unjust, or unless
it is founded upon an adequate, sufficient and
fnir consideration''.
This Decedent after the 1naking of the ,,. . ills and Agreemrnts hnving married Ben S. Rrf\"~Bter and upon his
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death having obtained only one third of his property
and only that which she was lawfully entitled to, it is
not just, equitable, conscionable and fair to enforce the
Reciprocal Will and Agreement against this Decedent
and her surviving husband, the Appellant herein. Respondents certainly parted with no consideration for
their continuance on as beneficiaries of this Decedent's
estate after the event of the marriage of their father
to this Decedent and her taking of one third of the
property of their father as his lawful wife.
In the case of Bagley vs. Bagley, Oregon, 222 P.
722, at Page 723, the Court states:
"The plaintiff's assumption, by virtue of the
marriage, of the duty she was to perform under
the first contract, destroyed the consideration
for the promise to make the will. There then remained no consideration for any contract by
which she vvould get anything from her husband,
beyond that inured to her from the marriage.
In other words, there was a complete supersession of the first con tract''.
Said case is the converse of the factual situation herein
but the decedent would have no right to enforce the Contract if the fact had been reversed. This being so, the
heirs of Brewster are in no better position.
The position of Respondents is based upon the assertion that the Decedent committed a fraud upon them
by reason of her making a Later Will in favor of this
Appe11ant. They certai'Illy cannot claim financial loss.
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This Decedent obtained only her lawful share of the
property of their father. This is not the case of a Decedent receiving benefits under the Will and then violating the Agreement. The benefits this Decedent received
were those only of the surviving wife of Ben S. Brewster.
This Decedent received one third of the property but
Respondents now claim all of her property. Courts consider the consideration involved. In the case of N ott en
vs. Mensing, 20 Cal. App. 2d. 694, 67 P. 2d. 734, the

Court in speaking on this issue says :
Page 698: '' Assunung for the purposes of
the decision that there was a purported agreen1ent between 1fr. and ).Irs. Notten, the question
arises was the agreement in the instant case one
which a court of equity will enforce? In Edso·n v.
Parsons, supra, the Supreme Court of Ke\Y York
enumerated these rules governing the CDurt.
It then said, 'These rules require the contrart
to be certain and definite in all its parts; that it
be 1nutual, and founded upon an adequate consideration and that it be establish b~· the clearest
and most convincing evidence. In this state these
rules are statutory. In J(lussJnan r. n·essling,
supra, the Supren1e Court of Illinois stated the
sa111c rule. It there set forth the facts in that
rase \Yhich ·showed that the surYiYing spouse
\rould have taken under the hr\\. \Yhat she Yrould
have takPn under the \rill. The (~ourt quoted
fron1 Lot"d 1ra1pole ·rs. Lord Orford, 3 \Ts Jr.
40:!. Tt then added ',,~ c ~l1onld hesitnte, on the
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evidence in this reeord, to hold that the consideration received by Louise Grimsell under the
will of her first husband was sufficient to require the enforcement of the alleged contract as
to her will of that date'. But the proportionate
value of the properties of the respective parties
differed only as to comparatively small sum.
Whereas in this case, they differed in the proportion of a thousand to one or thereabouts. In
Haddock v. Knapp, 171 Cal. 59, (151 Pac. 1140)
the Court affirmed the judgment of the trial
court in which it refused to compel the performance of a contract to exchange where the
values stood as $2800.00 to $1400.00 because the
consideration was not adequate. For this additional reason we think the trial court did not err
in denying a decree in favor of the plaintiffs".
There was no basis in fact and equity for decreeing
specific performance of the Reciprocal Will of this decedent and the Agreement for the reasons hereinbefore
pointed out and argued. Under Point II. of his Brief,
Hoyt W. Brewster, contends that the Contract was not
revoked. However, under the Authorities herein cited
such Agreement is not enforceable. Primarily, before
seeking equitable relief parties must suffer a 'vrong.
Respondents have not suffered that wrong. True, they
do not obtain the property of the decedent which they
have coveted for years. But, other than that Respondents
have suffered no "\Vrong or injury by reason of the acts
of this Decedent in leaving her property to this Appellant who was her dutiful husband for some year.s
before her decease.
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POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN SAID JUDGMENT BY DECREEING THAT ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF DECEDENT AT TIME OF HER DEATH BE
AWARDED TO RESPONDENTS.
This Decedent and Appellant were married on August 25, 1952 (8825, R. 70) and on January 20, 1956 this
Decedent expired. During such period, they being husband and wife, their respective property interests were
co-mingled undoubtedly. However, the Trial Court by
its Judgment (8825 R. 88-90) grants to and awards to
Respondents specific performance of the reciprocal will
and agreement insofar as the same applies to any and

all properties described in the instruments or any and
all assets ·of the estate of this Decedent. (8823, Paragraph
:1 of Judg1nent, R. 89). In Paragraph 5. (a) of said

Judgment, (88~3, R. 89) ~\.ppellant is to deli\er all proceeds from the insnrance policies '\Yith ''·est Coast Life
Insuranre Con1pany, Businessn1en 's .L\ssurance Company,
nnd ResPl'\'"e Life Insurance ('iolnpany benefits.

By

Pnragraph 5 (b) of said Judgment (SS~5 R. 90), Appellant is required to deli,. er to respondents all n1oneys
in any bank account, "'"hether held solely or jointly, in
the na1ne of decedent and specifically any and all moneys
\vithdra \rn by hiln from any such accounts since the

dPn t h of deredPnt, cxrept as to any n1oney contributed
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by Appellant. The portion thereof beginning with ''except'' was inserted by the Trial Court after Motion For
New Trial in said case was argued by eounsel for Appellant. (8825 R. 91) By Paragraph 5 (c) of said Judgment, (8825 R. 90) Respondents are awarded any and
all other personal ·or real property of any kind or nature whatsoever and wheresoever located that are a part
of the estate of Maude Karren Richards.
The Trial Court took no evidence as to the existence
,vf the property, vvhether real or personal, which it decreed to Respondents. No concern vvas given as to the
fact that Appellant by Order of the Court (8825 R. 14
and 15) was directed not to colle-ct and receive any insurance policies of decedent. Appellant obeyed this
Order but yet he is required to deliver the proceeds of
policies of insurance which he was ordered heretofore
not to collect. Further, there will of necessity be some
further litigation in said Case No. 8825 to determine
which property belongs to whom. Appellant cannot be
required to surrender his own hard earned dollars to
Respondents vvhich he with full confidence in his wife,
the Decedent, placed in their joint account. The J udgment is unconscionable, unjust and inequitable upon that
score.
The Agreement, (8825 Ex. 1, R. 60) refers to Decedent as owning "\Vest Coa.st I_.jife Insurance Policy,
Businessmen's Assurance Policy, Savings Accounts in
,,~ alker Bank and Trust Company, FirBt Security Bank
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and Trust Company, and Zion's Savings Bank and Trust
Company, A Home and Household Furniture situated
therein located at 1346 Thornton Avenue, Salt Lake
City, Utah, certain mining .stock in Vanadium Company
and certain personal belongings. Said Agreement specifically lists the property of the de-cedent, Maude l{arren Richards. The Reciprocal \"\. . ill of decedent, (8825,
Ex. 1, R. 60) itemizes the same property of said decedent
as set forth in said Agreement. If the Trial Court was
correct in decreeing specific performance of such Reciprocal ''Till and Agreement, then its Judgment should
have been confined to the specific items, if proper}~~
sho,vn to have been in existence, of property, real and
personal, as listed in the Reciprocal Will and Agreement.
There is no general carry all clause whereby decedent
agrees to give Respondent all of her real and personal
property owned by her at the time of her decease. Respondents demand and insist that they are entitled to
and should receive all property of this Decedent and
even that property acquired after the making of the
I~eeiprocal

\\'"ill and ..._-\_greeiuent and that property ac-

quired h~r Decedent 'Yith this ..._\ppellant. In 97 C. J. S.
Section 1368, Page 323, it is stated:
"The makers of a joint and mutual 'vill, or
of mutual "~ills, have the right and po,ver to provide that all of the property owned by· the survivor at hi~ denth shall pas~ under and be bounrl
hy the tPrnls of their will, but such effect shall
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not be given to mutual wills unless the intention
to do so is set forth in the will by very plain,
specific and unambiguous language. In the absence of such clearly expressed intention, after
acquired property owned by the survivor in his
or her individual right is held not to pass, but
under other authority, while the terms of the will
may not be overlooked in considering the question as to such after acquired property, it is essentially the terms of the contract which control''.
Assuming that Decedent had, after making such
vVill and Agreement, entered the millionaire class or
that she had entered the destitute class, then what
property should be covered and subjected to the J udgment of the Court which -decrees specific performance
of the Reciprocal Will and

Agreement~

The only prop-

erty is that specified in the Will and Agreement and
nothing more. If \vhen enforcement time arrives the
property exists then the beneficiaries take. If it does
not ·e xist then they do not take. They are in no better
class than the usual beneficiaries under a Last Will and
Testament. However, the Trial Court by its Judgment
herein has made these Respondents preferred to all
others.
Under the doctrines of J(lussman vs. ·Wessling,
supra, and N ott en vs. IJ{ensing., supra, Respondents are
not entitled -to specific performance of this Reciprocal
\Vill and Agreement. The Decedent was not unjustly
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enriched at the loss of Respondents since she as the wife
of Ben S. Brewster received only \vhat the law would
have given her. Ho\vever, Respondents stand to be unjustly enriched at the expense of this Appellant. Appellant is truly an innocent by-stander to the \Yhole
transactions between this Decedent, Ben S. Bre\vster and
the Respondents. Yet, Appellant is subjected to having
his property given to perfect strangers. Respondents
are strangers to him and they were certainly not the
heirs at law of the Decedent. The parties to, including
the Respondents, the transactions desired that same be
hush hush but said _.._<\green1ent and

\\~ill

n1ust be thor-

oughly examined and thi.s . A. ppellant as the innocent
pnrty must be protected in his rights.

CONCLUSION
Earh and every Point argued in Brief of Hoyt \Y.
Brewster, has been ans\vered herein or sho\\11 to be not
n pplicable.

In thc.Re cases as consolidated loquaciousness has
been avoided by counsel for both Respondents and Appellant and this is co1nmendable in

Yie\\~

of the far reach-

ing· effeet of the issues.
In <Jases 8682 and 8683, t.he Trial Court properly

that the Last \Y.ill and

ruled au<l the effeet thereof

\Yas

ri 1 PKbl1TICllt of this decedent,

Sfilll0

being the ()logrnphie
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\Vill, dated September 20, 1962, was adn1itted to probate. In said Cases, under the law and the facts, the
Trial Court must be upheld in its rulings and judgments.
In Case No. 8825, under the facts and the law, the
Judgment of the Trial Court decreeing specific performance should be reversed and the cause remanded
to the Trial Court with directions to dismiss the action
brought by

Respondent~s

with prejudice and upon its

merits. However, if there be justification determined
by this Court for the Trial Court decreeing specific performance, then the cause should be remanded by this
Court to the Trial Court ".,.ith directions to limit such
specific performance to the items of property, if in existence, as specified in the Agreement and to free the
property of this Appellant completely from the effect
of such Judgment decreeing specific performance in favor of Re,spondents.
Respectfully Submitted,
BARCLAY AND BARC·LAY
Attorneys folf' William Barlow
109-110-111 Atlas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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